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 Information value, export and hedging
The paper analyzes the interactions between the precision of information,
trade and welfare within a decision framework of an exporting rm. Infor-
mation in a nancial market is described in terms of a publicly observable
signal. With higher transparency, the signal conveys more precise informa-
tion about the random foreign exchange rate. More precise information about
exchange rate changes has ambiguous eects on trade and welfare which de-
pend critically on technology of the rm and the degree of risk aversion.
1 Introduction
In an uncertain economic global environment national and international rms
choose actions based on the currently available information. In order to
model information one can use a signaling approach, i.e. rms observe ran-
dom signals which are corrleated to an unknown state of nature or a market
price, and update their beliefs before actions take place. The link between
the quality of a public signal and decision making can be interpreted as mar-
ket transparency. This paper deals with transparency in nancial markets
and its role for decision making of an exporting rm under exchange rate
risk.
In our study a publicly observable signal is correlated with the random
foreign exchange rate; hence the signal conveys information about the un-
known foreign exchange rate. The signal allows market participants to up-
date their beliefs (in a Bayesian manner). The risk-averse rm has access
to a foreign exchange futures market in which it can hedge its net exposure
connected with its export activities.1 Prices and contracts traded on the
foreign exchange futures market depend upon market transparency.
In the literature, there are dierent analytical concepts measuring the
degree of informativeness and proposing an order of the underlying informa-
tion systems. The concept proposed by Blackwell, 1953, is widely used. The
notion of transparency in our study is adopted from the work by Eckwert
and Zilcha, 2001, Drees and Eckwert, 2003, Eckwert and Zilcha, 2003. They
1For international rms, see, Kawai and Zilcha, 1986, Friberg, 1998, Broll et al. 2001,
Wong, 2003, Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005, Friberg and Wilander, 2008, Hens and
Rieger, 2010, to name just a few.
2characterize market transparency by using a criterion which is conceptually
related to the literature that emerged from the seminal work by Blackwell,
1953.2 More transparency or more reliable information means that market
participants can make better economic decisions. When the information is
of public nature, rather than privately owned by some individuals, it will be
used by other agents, too. Under such circumstances the information may
aect endogenous market mechanisms.
When individuals make decisions in isolation from others, more reliable
information is generally benecial, i.e. in the expected utility framework
the value of informaion is always nonnegative. However, more information
can have detrimental eects if the information aects risk sharing arrange-
ments in the economy (Hirshleifer, 1971, 1975, Schlee, 2001) or if agents
interact strategically using private information and public information si-
multaneously. We abstract from informational asymmetries but we allow for
risk sharing through a competitive foreign exchange futures market. While
market transparency does not aect the risk premium on this market, it does
have implications for the amount of risks that will be shared in equilibrium
(Morris and Shin, 2002).
We demonstrate that the impact of more precise information on the rm's
ex ante expected production for export depends on the demand conditions in
the market abroad (i.e. elasticities of demand). However, more transparency,
always leads to an increase in the ex ante expected prot of the rm. Im-
plications for the ex ante expected utility of the rm are also discussed. We
claim that it is possible that the rm will be worse o when more information
is derived from each signal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model
of an international rm under exchange rate risk with hedging opportunities.
In section 3, we introduce the concept of market transparency that underlies
the analysis. Section 4 derives the main results. The nal section concludes.
2For other concepts of information and market transparency that have been used in the
economic literature, see Wahl, 1983, Heinemann and Illing, 2002, Krebs, 2005, De Haan
et al. 2005.
32 The exporting rm
Consider a risk-averse international rm that makes decisions under exchange
rate uncertainty in a one-period horizon with three dates (indexed by t =  1;
t = 0 and t = +1). At t = 0, the rm produces a single homogeneous good
in the home country according to a constant marginal cost c; total cost are
given by cq where q is the level of total output for export. The rm sells its
output at t = 1 in the world market.
We assume that the rm enjoys some monopoly power in the foreign mar-
ket. The revenues from foreign sales are governed by a strictly increasing and
concave function, r(q), with r(0) = 0;r0(0) = 1, and r0(1) = 0. Revenues r
are denominated in the foreign currency.3 The rm faces exchange rate un-
certainty in that the spot exchange rate at t = 1, denoted by ~ e and expressed
in units of the home currency per unit of the foreign currency, is not known
at t = 0.4 The random spot exchange rate, ~ e, has a prior probability density
function, f(e), over support [e;e], where 0 < e < e < 1.
There is a public signal, ~ y, released by the government, the central bank
or specialized agencies at t =  1 before the rm makes its decisions on
production and risk management. Let n(y) be the prior probability density
function of ~ y over support [y;y], where  1 < y < y < 1. The signal, ~ y, is
correlated with the random spot exchange rate, ~ e, and thus contains valuable
information about ~ e. Let (ejy) be the posterior probability density function
of ~ e conditioned on ~ y = y over support [e;e]. At t = 0, the rm makes its
decisions using the conditional expectation operator, E(jy), with respect to
(ejy). The rm updates its belief in a Bayesian manner.
The rm has access to a foreign exchange futures market for hedging
purposes. The foreign exchange futures market opens at t = 0 after the
public signal has been revealed. Let ef be the futures exchange rate that is
determined at t = 0 and is expressed in units of the home currency per unit
of the foreign currency. The rm sells (purchases if negative) h units of the
currency futures at t = 0, which are settled at t = 1 at the then prevailing
spot exchange rate. Thus, the rm's prot at t = 1, denominated in the
3The currency of the customer is the most used, both for trade within and across
company groups; see Friberg and Wilander, 2008.
4Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde while their realizations do not.
4home currency, is given by
~  = ~ er(q)   cq + (ef   ~ e)h: (1)
We assume that the foreign exchange futures market is unbiased, i.e.,




for all y 2 [y;y]. Hence, Eq. (2) implies that the futures exchange rate, ef,
is a function of the signal, y, in general and a linear function of the posterior
probability density function, (ejy), in particular.
The rm possesses a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function, u(),
dened over its home currency prot at t = 1, , with u0() > 0 and u00() <
0, indicating risk aversion. At t = 0, the rm chooses a level of exports,
q, and a futures position, h, so as to maximize the expected utility of its






u[er(q)   cq + (ef   e)h](ejy)de; (3)






)   c]jyg = 0; (4)
E[u
0(~ 
)(ef   ~ e)jy] = 0; (5)
where an asterisk () signies an optimal level.














5Eq. (6) implies that the rm's optimal output for trade, q, is uniquely
determined by equating the marginal foreign revenue, r0(q), converted into
the home currency using the futures exchange rate, ef, to marginal cost
c. Thus, we have established for our model the separation and full-hedging
hypotheses.5 These hypotheses claim that, in the presence of a currency
exchange forward market, production for export is independent on attitudes
towards risk and, for the special case of an unbiased forward market, that
exchange rate risks will be fully hedged.
3 Information and more market transparency
We describe transparency in the foreign exchange market by means of the
informativeness of the signal, ~ y, that is publicly observable. The signal's
informativeness depends on the information system. An information system,
denoted by g, species for each state of the nature, e, a conditional probability
density function, g(yje), over the set of signals, [y;y]. The function, g(yje),
which generates the signal for a given spot exchange rate at t = 1, e, is
common knowledge.
Given the information system, g, the prior probability density function,





for all y 2 [y;y]. By Bayes' rule, the posterior probability density function,





for all y 2 [y;y], where n(y) is given by Eq. (9). Blackwell (1953) suggests
the following criterion that ranks dierent information systems according to
their informational content.
Denition 1 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems for the random
spot exchange rate at t = 1, ~ e. We say that g1 is more informative than g2,
expressed by g1 inf g2, if there exists an integrable function, (y0;y), such





0 = 1; (11)









for all e 2 [e;e].
According to Denition 1, g1 inf g2 holds if g2 can be obtained from
g1 through a process of randomization. Eq. (11) states that (y0;y) is a
probability density function that transforms the signal, y, into a new signal,
y0. It is evident from Eq. (12) that the information system, g2, can be
interpreted as being obtained from the information system, g1, by adding
random noise. Since (y0;y) does not depend on the realization of ~ e, the
signals under the information system, g2, cannot convey any information
about the random spot exchange rate at t = 1, which is not conveyed by the
signals under the information system, g1. As a result, g1 must contain more
information about ~ e than g2.
Our notion of transparency in the foreign exchange market is based on the
informational content of the signal, y, about the random spot exchange rate
at t = 1, ~ e. We describe the foreign exchange market as more transparent if
y conveys more precise information about ~ e.
Denition 2 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems for the random spot
exchange rate at t = 1, ~ e. We say that the foreign exchange market is more
transparent under g1 than under g2 if g1 inf g2.
The following Lemma formulates an alternative transparency criterion
that is equivalent to the condition stated in Denition 2, which is useful in
our subsequent economic analysis.
Lemma 1 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems for the random spot
exchange rate at t = 1, ~ e. The foreign exchange market is more transparent











for any given convex function, F(), dened on the set of probability density
functions over support [e;e].
7A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom, 1984. Since 1(jy)
and 2(jy) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems, g1
and g2, respectively, Lemma 1 implies that more transparency in the foreign
exchange market (weakly) raises the expectations of any convex functions of
posterior beliefs. If F() is any given concave function dened on the set of
probability density functions over support [e;e], inequality (13) is reversed.
4 Economic implications of higher market transparency
The key variable of interest in the comparative static exercise is ef since the
forward exchange rate is a function of the signal, y, in general and a linear
function of the posterior probability density function, (ejy), in particular,
as is evident from Eq. (2). Rewrite Eq. (6) as
efr
0(q
(ef))   c = 0: (14)






Eq. (15) implies that an increase in the futures exchange rate, ef, makes
exports more attractive and raising the level of exports, q(ef). The rm's












More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher (lower)
expected level of export, q, if the marginal revenue function, r0(q), is convex
(concave).
Proof By Eq. (2), ef is linear in the posterior belief, (jy). It then follows
from Eq. (16) and Lemma 1 that q increases (decreases) with more trans-
parency if q(ef) is convex (concave) in ef. Dierentiating Eq. (15) with






8The desired results then follow from Eq. (18). q.e.d
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. Let us say that signal y0 is
`better' than signal y, if it corresponds with a higher conditionally expected
exchange rate, i.e., ef(y0) > ef(y). The rm's exports are increasing in
ef and, hence, are higher for good signals than for bad signals. But with
more transparency, a good signal becomes even better because it is more
reliable. As a consequence, production for export rises. For the same reason,
a bad signal becomes worse in a more transparent foreign exchange market
and, consequently, production for export declines. If the marginal revenue
in foreign currency is decreasing at a decreasing (an increasing) rate, the
transparency-induced increase in exports for good signals is larger (smaller)
than the transparency-induced decrease in exports for bad signals. As such,
the expected level of production and sales for international trade goes up
(down) if the marginal revenue function is convex (concave).
Suppose that the exporting rm has the following inverse demand func-
tion pD(q) in the foreign market, where q is the amount of export. Since
r(q) = pD(q)q, the marginal revenue function is convex or concave, depending
on whether 3p00
D(q)+p000
D(q)q is positive or negative, respectively. Suppose that
pD(q) = q , where 1= 2 (0;1) is the constant elasticity of demand.6 In this
example, the marginal revenue function is convex so that more transparency
in the foreign exchange market increases the expected level of foreign sales.
On the other hand, if the inverse demand function is linear, the marginal
revenue function is also linear. In this example, making the foreign exchange
market more transparent has no eect on the expected level of exports.







More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to an increase in the
expected prot of the rm.
Proof By Eq. (2), ef(y) is linear in the posterior belief, (jy). It then follows
from Eq. (18) and Lemma 1 that  increases with more transparency if
(ef) is convex in ef. Dierentiating Eq. (15) with respect to ef and using
6We require 1= < 1 to ensure that the revenue function, r(q), is concave.




The desired result then follows from Eq. (14). q.e.d




An increase in ef has a rst-order eect on the rm's maximum prot through
the export revenues. Since the rm exports more when ef increases, this rst-
order eect on (ef) is stronger for larger ef and weaker for lower ef. As
a result, the rm's prot function is unambiguously convex in ef. A more
transparent foreign exchange market makes ef more sensitive to changes in
the public signal. Thus, the rm benets from increased transparency in
that its expected prot is always higher.
One might expect that less uncertainty due to more market transparency
would generally be welfare enhancing. However, in our model we show that
this is not necessarily the case. The rm's optimal utility level for a given
futures exchange rate, ef, conditional on the observed signal, y, is given by







With more transparency, from an ex ante perspective the forward rate be-
comes more risky as it reacts more sensitively to random signal changes.
Higher transparency therefore imposes welfare costs on the risk-averse rm.
This risk eect is sometimes called the `Hirshleifer-eect'. On the other hand,
the greater informational content of the signal permits better production and
export decisions which result in welfare gains. The total impact of higher
transparency on the ex ante welfare of the rm consists of these two opposing
eects. In the following we claim
Proposition 3 More transparency in the foreign exchange market increases
the rm's ex ante expected utility if the rm is risk-neutral or if (partial) risk
aversion is suciently small. If the rm is highly risk-averse, the transparency-
induced negative risk eect may dominate the positive trade eect and, hence,
ex ante expected utility may decline with higher transparency.
10Proof By Lemma 1, U increases (decreases) with more transparency if
U[(ef)] is convex (concave) in ef. Dierentiating U[(ef(y))] twice with











) + r;qq;ef; (23)
where 
 = ef=rU0[(ef)] and Eqs. (13){(16) are used. Elasticites with re-
spect to foreign revenues and exports are r;q and q;ef respectively. q.e.d
The rst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (23) captures the negative
risk eect (Hirshleifer eect). This eect vanishes if the rm is risk-neutral
and is otherwise increasing in the rm's (partial risk) aversion towards risk.
The second term in Eq. (23) captures a positive trade eect which results
from the rm's improved foreign market position (Blackwell eect).
The (negative) risk eect is stronger the more risk-averse the rm is;
and the (positive) trade eect is stronger the more elastic the amount of
exports is to changes in the forward exchange rate. Hence, we can conclude
that the international rm is made better o with more transparency in the
foreign exchange market if the rm is not too risk-averse and/or the amount
of exports is suciently elastic to changes in the forward exchange rate.
The conclusion from Proposition 3 is that revealing more information to
the market does not always guarantee improving the situation of those risk-
averse agents in the market. In fact, more information results in two eects
which do not always work in the same direction. On the one hand more
precise information results in a better distribution of random exchange rate
used in the process of maximizing expected prots from exports. On the
other hand, it aects the demand for futures contracts, and changes in the
forward exchange rate. This change in the futures exchange rate can reduce
welfare of the risk-averse rm and outweigh the advantages derived from the
better distribution due to higher market transparency.
5 Conclusion
Our paper develops a theoretical framework to examine the interaction be-
tween market transparency, risk sharing opportunities and production of
goods for exports under exchange rate uncertainty. The aim of our study
is to discuss the economic value of information. The uncertainty to which
11the international rm is exposed when it decides about its resource alloca-
tion for production to international markets depends on the observed signal
as well as on the information system within which the signal can be inter-
preted. We characterize the foreign exchange market as more transparent
if the signal conveys more precise information about the unknown foreign
exchange rate. Thus, more transparency means that the exchange rate un-
certainty is reduced through the disclosure of more reliable information. We
show that the eects of more transparency in the foreign exchange market
on exports critically depend on the demand conditions in the foreign mar-
ket. More transparency, however, always leads to an increase in the expected
prot of the rm. We also oer reasonable conditions under which the ex
ante expected utility of the exporting rm is improved by making the foreign
exchange market more transparent.
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